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OPINION  
________________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. brought this action against 
Virgin Island Sailing School (“VISS”) and its co-founder 
Scott Dempster, alleging, in relevant part, that Defendants 
infringed upon Fair Wind’s “trade dress” in violation of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., and unjustly enriched 
themselves by copying Fair Wind’s business.  The District 
Court dismissed Fair Wind’s trade dress and unjust 
enrichment claims, and subsequently awarded Defendants 
fees under Virgin Islands law.  Fair Wind challenges both the 
dismissal of its claims and the award of attorneys’ fees.   
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 The District Court properly concluded that Fair Wind 
failed to state claims for trade dress infringement and unjust 
enrichment.  As to the former claim, Fair Wind has failed to 
adequately explain what “dress” it seeks to protect, and its 
trade dress, as pleaded, is functional in nature.  As to the latter 
claim, Fair Wind has not pleaded with sufficient particularity 
in what manner Defendants have been unjustly enriched.  We 
therefore affirm the dismissal of both claims. 
 
 However, we agree with Fair Wind that the District 
Court improperly awarded fees for the entirety of the 
litigation under Virgin Islands law.  While it would have been 
appropriate for the District Court to award reasonable fees 
accrued defending the territorial law claims, an award for the 
portion of the fees accrued defending the Lanham Act claim 
was appropriate only to the extent that this was an 
“exceptional” case.  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  The District Court 
did not decide whether this case was an “exceptional” one.  
We therefore remand the fee dispute for further proceedings.  
In the wake of new Supreme Court precedent, we take this 
opportunity to amend our recently-abrogated jurisprudence on 
the standard for finding “exceptionality” under § 35(a) of the 
Lanham Act. 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 The complaint alleges the following facts, which we 
assume to be true and construe in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff.   See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 
(2009).   
 
 4 
 Fair Wind is a Michigan corporation that owns sailing 
schools throughout the United States, including one in St. 
Thomas, Virgin Islands.  The St. Thomas school exclusively 
uses catamarans.1      
  
 In July 2007, Fair Wind hired Larry Bouffard as a 
captain and sailing instructor for its St. Thomas school.  
Bouffard entered into a contract with Fair Wind, which 
contained a provision precluding Bouffard from joining a Fair 
Wind competitor within 20 miles of the St. Thomas school for 
two years after the end of his employment with Fair Wind.  A 
popular instructor, Bouffard stayed with Fair Wind for over 
three years.   
 
 In June 2010, Bouffard introduced Dempster to Fair 
Wind as a potential instructor and captain.  Relying on 
Bouffard’s assurance that Dempster was qualified for the 
post, Fair Wind hired Dempster for a probationary two-week 
period.  Fair Wind was dissatisfied with Dempster’s 
performance, and declined to retain Dempster at the end of 
those two weeks.   
 
 Shortly after Fair Wind terminated Dempster, Bouffard 
resigned.  At or about this time, however, Dempster and 
Bouffard decided to open a sailing school together in St. 
Thomas.  By the following winter, Dempster and Bouffard’s 
                                              
1 For our landlocked readers, a catamaran is a boat “with twin 
hulls and usually a deck or superstructure connecting the 
hulls.”  Catamaran Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catamaran (last 
visited July 9, 2014). 
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school, VISS, was up and running, in direct competition with 
Fair Wind.  Opening VISS violated Bouffard’s two-year non-
compete agreement with Fair Wind. 
 
 Since its inception, VISS has copied Fair Wind’s St. 
Thomas school in several respects.  VISS employs 45-foot 
catamarans, the same boats used by Fair Wind.  VISS also 
uses teaching curriculum and itineraries identical to those 
used by Fair Wind, and employs the same procedures for 
student feedback.  The marketing on VISS’s website is 
identical to Fair Wind’s marketing.  Additionally, the VISS 
website contains a picture of a catamaran belonging to Fair 
Wind, includes “student testimonials” from students who took 
classes with Dempster while he worked for Fair Wind, and 
mentions Bouffard’s experience teaching “[o]ver the last 
year,” presumably in reference to his time teaching at Fair 
Wind.  First Am. Compl. ¶ 32.  
 
 Fair Wind alleges that “[s]ince VISS began competing 
with Fair Wind, Fair Wind has lost considerable business and 
reputation.”  Id. ¶ 35.  It also alleges that “Dempster and 
VISS have been enriched by their improper and unjustified 
conduct.”  Id. ¶ 48. 
 
B. 
 
 Fair Wind filed an action against Dempster and VISS 
in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  The complaint, as 
amended shortly thereafter, alleged three claims against 
Dempster and Fair Wind: (1) a “trade dress” infringement 
claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act; (2) a common-law 
tortious interference claim; and (3) a common-law unjust 
enrichment claim.  VISS filed a motion to partially dismiss 
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the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, arguing that Fair Wind failed to state claims 
for trade dress infringement or unjust enrichment.   
 
 The District Court concluded that Fair Wind had failed 
to state claims for either trade dress infringement or unjust 
enrichment.  As to the trade dress claim, the District Court 
concluded that the complaint had several dispositive flaws.  
First, the District Court explained that Fair Wind had failed to 
allege facts about its business that “amount[ed] to its trade 
dress.”  Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, No. 2011-55, 
2013 WL 1091310, at *4 (D.V.I. Mar. 15, 2013).  “Without 
knowing the precise product features that Fair Wind seeks to 
protect” as trade dress, the District Court “struggle[d] to 
undertake a productive Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.”  Id.  Second, 
assuming that the product features at issue amounted to a 
trade dress, the Court determined that the complaint was 
“devoid of any allegations that [these features were] 
inherently distinctive or ha[d] acquired any secondary 
meaning.” Id. at *4-5.  Third, the District Court determined 
that the product features comprising Fair Wind’s alleged trade 
dress were “functional” and therefore fell beyond the 
protections of the Lanham Act.  Id. at *5-6.  With respect to 
the unjust enrichment claim, the District Court concluded that 
Fair Wind had failed to “allege any facts to support the first 
element required for an unjust enrichment claim—that the 
defendant was enriched.”  Id. at *7.  Accordingly, the District 
Court granted VISS’s motion to dismiss in its entirety.  In 
response, Fair Wind voluntarily dismissed its remaining claim 
for tortious interference, making the judgment final and 
appealable.  See Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 
F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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 Thereafter, Defendants moved for $41,783 in 
attorneys’ fees under § 35(a) of the Lanham Act and Title 5, 
section 541 of the Virgin Islands Code.  This constituted the 
“total amount of legal fees incurred by Defendants in this 
matter” over the course of the litigation.  App. 64.  Relying 
solely on the Virgin Islands fee statute, the District Court 
concluded that Defendants were entitled to a “fair and 
reasonable award of attorney’s fees” for their effort defending 
the entirety of this case.  Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 
No. 2011-55, 2014 WL 886832, at *1 (D.V.I. Mar. 6, 2014).  
After concluding that a portion of the fees sought was 
unreasonably expended, the District Court awarded 
Defendants fees in the amount of  $36,347.  Id. at *3.   
 
 Fair Wind filed separate, timely appeals of both the 
dismissal order and the fees order, which were subsequently 
consolidated for disposition.2   
 
II. 
 
 We first consider Fair Wind’s trade dress claim.  Like 
the District Court, we conclude that Fair Wind has failed to 
properly state a claim for trade dress infringement.  We 
therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the claim.3   
                                              
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a).  We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
3 In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts 
must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
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 Section 43(a) of the federal Lanham Trademark Act 
sets forth the standard for infringement of unregistered 
trademarks.  It provides in relevant part that:  
 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with 
any goods or services, or any container for 
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, 
or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which — (A) 
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of 
his or her goods, services, or commercial 
activities by another person, or (B) in 
commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another person’s goods, services, or commercial 
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any 
                                                                                                     
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim 
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
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person who believes that he or she is or is likely 
to be damaged by such act.  
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).  Section 43(a) protects from 
deceptive imitation not only a business’s trademarks, but also 
its “trade dress.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3); Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.763, 776 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).  “Trade dress has been defined as the total image 
or overall appearance of a product, and includes, but is not 
limited to, such features as size, shape, color or color 
combinations, texture, graphics, or even a particular sales 
technique.” Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 
171 (3d Cir. 2000).  In short, trade dress is the overall look of 
a product or business. See, e.g., Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 
at 765 (the decor of a restaurant); Am. Greetings Corp. v. 
Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d Cir. 1986) (a 
line of teddy bears with “tummy graphics”); see also Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 
1037 (2d Cir. 1992) (graphics and arrangement of elements 
on a box of Excedrin).  
 
 “The purpose of trade dress protection is to ‘secure the 
owner of the trade dress the goodwill of his business and to 
protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among 
competing producers.’”  McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. 
Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 353 
(3d Cir. 2003)).  Trade dress protection does not shield 
businesses from plagiarism.  See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003). Indeed, 
“[t]rade dress protection must subsist with the recognition 
that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying 
goods and products.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, 
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Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. 
v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Copying 
is not only good, it is a federal right—a necessary 
complement to the patent system’s grant of limited 
monopolies.”).  Thus, the law does not afford every 
combination of visual elements exclusive legal rights.  
Instead, “trade dress protection extends only to incidental, 
arbitrary or ornamental product features which identify the 
product’s source.” Shire US, 329 F.3d at 353.  
 
 A plaintiff must prove three elements to establish trade 
dress infringement under the Lanham Act: “(1) the allegedly 
infringing design is nonfunctional; (2) the design is inherently 
distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning; and (3) 
consumers are likely to confuse the source of the plaintiff’s 
product with that of the defendant’s product.”  McNeil 
Nutritionals, 511 F.3d at 357.  In addition to satisfying these 
three elements, it is the plaintiff’s duty to “articulat[e] the 
specific elements which comprise its distinct dress.”  See 
Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 
373, 381 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, 
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 8:3 (4th 
ed. 2014) (“[T]he discrete elements which make up the [trade 
dress claim] should be separated out and identified in a 
list.”).4  This allows the district court to ensure that the claim 
                                              
4 For example, in Rose Art Industries, the plaintiff claimed 
that the following elements comprised its trade dress:  
 
(1) a prominent band that is either straight or 
wavy and often black in color that cuts across 
the middle of the front of the package, 
extending to the sides with the words 
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is not “pitched at an improper level of generality, i.e., the 
claimant [does not] seek[] protection for an unprotectable 
style, theme or idea.” Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 381.  
Even before it reaches the question of protectability, however, 
a district court should scrutinize a plaintiff’s description of its 
trade dress to ensure itself that the plaintiff seeks protection 
                                                                                                     
“CRAYONS” or “WASHABLE MARKERS” 
or other descriptive term in white letters 
imprinted on the band (the “Band and Letter 
feature”); (2) a yellow background on the top of 
the package with a contrasting background 
color (either red, purple, pink, or a combination 
of purple fading to red) on the bottom of the 
package; and (3) a prominent display of the 
Rose Art logo in golden yellow (either foil or 
print) or red, either with or without a rainbow 
“swish” design behind the logo on the front of 
the package. In addition, in its presentation to 
the District Court, Rose Art included three other 
elements in its claim of infringement: (1) the 
statement “since 1923”; (2) the statement on the 
front of the package that the product is 
“Certified Non–Toxic;” and (3) the sentence 
inviting consumer comments, “Rose Art invites 
your comments and questions about this 
product. Please write to Rose Art Industries, 
Inc., Consumer Affairs, 6 Regent St., 
Livingston, NJ 07039 or call 1–800–
CRAYONS.” 
 
235 F.3d at 169. 
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of visual elements of its business.  As the Sixth Circuit has 
noted, “any ‘thing’ that dresses a good can constitute trade 
dress.”  Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle 
Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 630 (6th Cir. 2002).  However, 
the “thing” must “dress[] a good.”  Id.  That is, the alleged 
trade dress must create some visual impression on consumers.  
Otherwise, there is simply no “dress” to protect.  
     
 According to Fair Wind, its trade dress is “the 
combination of its choice to solely employ catamaran 
vessels” and its “unique teaching curriculum, student 
testimonials, and registered domain name,” which “all 
combine to identify Fair Wind’s uniquely configured business 
to the general public.”  Appellant’s Br. at 20-21.5  By its own 
terms, then, Fair Wind’s “trade dress” is simply a hodgepodge 
of unconnected pieces of its business, which together do not 
comprise any sort of composite visual effect.  Fair Wind is 
not arguing that VISS stole Fair Wind’s “look” in order to 
lure away customers.  In fact, several of the elements of Fair 
                                              
5 Although Fair Wind asserts in its briefs on appeal that 
VISS’s domain name is nearly identical to Fair Wind’s, the 
complaint makes no such allegation, nor can one reasonably 
infer such an allegation.  While the complaint mentions 
VISS’s domain name, see First Am. Compl. ¶ 5, it never 
discusses Fair Wind’s web address.  Because we cannot 
consider allegations outside the complaint, the similarity in 
the parties’ domain names cannot play a part in our analysis.  
In any event, the fact that the parties have similar web 
addresses, even if properly pleaded, does not alter our 
conclusion that Fair Wind has failed to allege a cognizable 
trade dress. 
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Wind’s trade dress—such as the teaching curriculum—are not 
clearly visual aspects of the business at all.6  Rather, Fair 
Wind asserts that Defendants have harmed Fair Wind “by 
copying every material element of Fair Wind’s business and 
presenting [it to] the public.”  Id. at 15.  This claim has little 
to do with trade dress.   
  
 Perhaps realizing its failure to plead a cognizable trade 
dress, Fair Wind pivoted at oral argument, placing its “web 
design” at the center of the trade dress claim.  But the 
complaint does not enumerate what specific elements of its 
website comprise a distinctive trade dress or that its site has 
any distinctive ornamental features.  Cf. Xuan-Thao N. 
Nguyen, Should It Be a Free for All? The Challenge of 
Extending Trade Dress Protection to the Look and Feel of 
Web Sites in the Evolving Internet, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 1233, 
1236, 1240 (2000) (arguing that a combination of a website’s 
“color, graphics, animations, designs, layout, [and] text” may 
qualify for trade dress protection). 
 
 Indeed, Fair Wind has failed to allege any facts at all 
relating to the substance of its own website.  True, the 
                                              
6 We do not suggest that the curriculum of a sailing school, if 
part of, for example, an overall look of a schoolhouse or a 
website, could not be part of a business’s trade dress.  Cf. 
Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 
841 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that a menu, in combination with 
other aspects of a restaurant’s decor, can constitute 
protectable trade dress).  But the complaint does not in any 
way indicate that Fair Wind’s curriculum creates any kind of 
visual impression.  It is not even clear from the complaint that 
Fair Wind’s curriculum is something that can be seen.   
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complaint suggests that VISS’s website contains a picture of a 
Fair Wind catamaran, as well as student feedback 
mechanisms, curriculum, and itineraries identical to those 
used by Fair Wind.  First. Am. Compl. ¶ 29.  But the fact that 
VISS has copied aspects of Fair Wind’s business and placed 
them on its website says nothing about the content of Fair 
Wind’s website, let alone whether Fair Wind’s website has a 
composite look  that might constitute a trade dress.  
 
 Because Fair Wind has failed to give Defendants 
adequate notice of what overall look it wishes to protect, its 
trade dress claim cannot survive Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.   
 
 But even assuming that Fair Wind had adequately 
stated the overall design it seeks to protect, its alleged “trade 
dress” is clearly functional, and therefore not protectable.  A 
functional feature is one that is “essential to the use or 
purpose of the article,” “affects the cost or quality of the 
article,” or one that, if kept from competitors, would put them 
at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”  
TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.  By contrast, a feature is 
nonfunctional where it “is unrelated to the consumer demand 
. . .  and serves merely to identify the source of the product” 
or business.  Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 
(8th Cir. 1986).  Student feedback procedures, catamarans, 
teaching itineraries, and curriculum all affect the quality of 
Fair Wind’s business.  They play a critical role in the 
consumer demand for Fair Wind’s services, rather than 
merely identifying Fair Wind as the source of the sailing 
instruction.  Cf. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (holding that the 
dual-spring design was not protectable because it had a 
purpose “beyond serving the purpose of informing consumers 
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that the sign stands are made by” the plaintiff).  Thus, Fair 
Wind’s alleged dress is plainly functional.   
 
 Rather than argue that the particular features of its 
“trade dress” are nonfunctional, Fair Wind argues that the 
various functional aspects of its business combine to create 
something nonfunctional.  Fair Wind’s argument rests on 
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., where the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the sum of particular functional 
elements in a pool hall, such as its counters and lighting, 
could amount to a nonfunctional look.  See 251 F.3d 1252, 
1261-62 (9th Cir. 2001). The Clicks court explained, “[t]he 
fact that individual elements of the trade dress may be 
functional does not necessarily mean that the trade dress as a 
whole is functional; rather, functional elements that are 
separately unprotectable can be protected together as part of 
trade dress.” Id. at 1259 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also id. at 1261 (“To be sure, many of these elements, 
considered in isolation, may be functional.  The issue, 
however, is whether, taken as a whole, the overall look and 
feel of the establishment is functional.”).  The plaintiff in 
Clicks offered evidence that its “composite tapestry of visual 
effects” had become associated with its pool halls and not 
others.  See id. at 1259, 1261-62.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiff’s trade dress claim should survive 
summary judgment.   
 
 In stark contrast to the plaintiff in Clicks, Fair Wind 
has not explained how the identified functional elements 
achieve a nonfunctional “composite tapestry of visual 
effects.”  Id. at 1259.  Fair Wind has not suggested, in its 
complaint or elsewhere, that its business has a distinctive 
appearance at all.  Clicks is therefore inapposite.  
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 In sum, Fair Wind has failed to allege a cognizable 
trade dress.  Moreover, to the extent that the complaint 
alleges that Fair Wind’s boats, curriculum, itineraries, and 
student feedback procedures are its trade dress, that trade 
dress is functional, and therefore not protectable.  Fair Wind’s 
claim does not hold water. 
 
III. 
 
 Fair Wind next argues that the District Court 
improperly dismissed its unjust enrichment claim by 
employing too exacting a pleading standard.  Specifically, the 
District Court concluded that Fair Wind had failed to properly 
plead that Defendants had been enriched by their conduct.  
We agree with the District Court that Fair Wind has failed to 
state a claim for unjust enrichment.  We therefore affirm. 
 
 To recover for unjust enrichment under Virgin Islands 
law, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant was 
enriched, (2) the enrichment was at the plaintiff’s expense, 
and (3) the circumstances were such that, in equity and good 
conscience, the defendant should return the money or 
property to the plaintiff. Martin v. Martin, 54 V.I. 379, 393-
94 (V.I. 2010).  To state the obvious, a defendant’s 
enrichment is critical to the success of an unjust enrichment 
claim.  See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment § 1 cmt. d. (“Restitution is concerned with the 
receipt of benefits that yield a measurable increase in the 
recipient’s wealth.”).   
 
 The premise of Fair Wind’s unjust enrichment claim is 
that Defendants gained, and Fair Wind lost, by Defendants 
“trading on Fair Wind’s trade dress, proprietary information 
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and trade secrets.”  First Am. Compl. ¶ 50.  As the District 
Court noted, however, the complaint contains no facts 
concerning in what respect Defendants were enriched, other 
than the conclusory assertion that “Dempster and VISS have 
been enriched by their improper and unjustified conduct.”  Id. 
at ¶ 48.   
 
 At the pleadings stage, it is often not possible for a 
plaintiff to recount with specificity to what extent a defendant 
was enriched by her misconduct.  That is what discovery is 
for.  At the same time, however, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to plead some 
factual allegations in order to survive a motion to dismiss.  
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  
Pleading the “mere elements” of a cause of action will not do.  
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233.  Here, Fair Wind has failed to even 
allege that Defendants’ business accrued additional profits by 
poaching Fair Wind’s proprietary information and trade 
secrets.  That may have satisfied Rule 8(a)(2)’s fairly lenient 
notice-pleading standard.  See id. at 234.  But the bald 
assertion that Defendants “have been enriched” does not. 
 
 Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal 
of Fair Wind’s unjust enrichment claim.   
 
IV. 
 
 We next address the District Court’s award of 
attorneys’ fees to the Defendants in the amount of $36,347.7  
                                              
7 “We exercise plenary review over legal issues relating to the 
appropriate standard under which to evaluate an application 
for attorneys’ fees. . . .  We review the reasonableness of the 
 18 
After reducing Defendants’ fee award by roughly $5,000 for 
excessive billing and vague time entries, the District Court 
awarded Defendants the remainder of their hours billed for 
the entirety of the litigation, relying solely on Title 5, section 
541 of the Virgin Islands Code.  See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc., 
2014 WL 886832, at *1-3.  The District Court did not attempt 
to segregate which fees were accrued defending the federal 
claim, nor did it discuss the Lanham Act as a basis for a fee 
award.  Id. 
 
A. 
 
 Section 541 provides in relevant part that “there shall 
be allowed to the prevailing party in the judgment such sums 
as the court in its discretion may fix by way of indemnity for 
his attorney’s fees in maintaining the action or defenses 
thereto.”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 541(b).  However, section 
541 does not permit a district court to award the prevailing 
party all of its attorneys’ fees where the case includes both 
territorial and federal causes of action.  Rather, “[i]n awarding 
fees to a prevailing party under section 541, . . . the court 
must subtract fees and costs associated with federal claims, as 
section 541 is only applicable to fees for the litigant who 
succeeds in pursuing [or defending] Virgin Islands territorial 
claims.”  Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 
183 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).   
                                                                                                     
District Court’s award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of 
discretion.”  Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 
716 F.3d 57, 64 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting People Against 
Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2008)). 
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 Defendants do not dispute that the District Court failed 
to “subtract fees and costs associated with” Fair Wind’s 
federal claim.  Id.  They nonetheless insist that “the District 
Court correctly chose to award Defendants . . . fees solely 
under Section [541] . . . as the attorneys’ fees expended in 
defending all three of [Fair Wind’s] causes of action were 
inextricably intertwined.”  Appellees’ Supplemental Br. at 9.  
Defendants “cit[e] . . . defense counsel’s timesheets” as 
evidence that “the fees incurred defending against Plaintiff’s 
claims for trade dress infringement, tortious interference with 
contract and unjust enrichment were ‘inextricably 
intertwined.’”  Id. at 23.   
 
 We have never approved of section 541 fees where the 
territorial and federal claims are “inextricably intertwined.”  
Acknowledging that we have not endorsed this argument, 
Defendants rely on a Ninth Circuit opinion, Gracie v. Gracie, 
217 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2000), for their proposed exception to 
the Figueroa rule.  There, the Ninth Circuit held that “a party 
cannot recover legal fees incurred in litigating non-Lanham 
Act claims unless the Lanham Act claims and non-Lanham 
Act claims are so intertwined that it is impossible to 
differentiate between work done on claims.”  Id. at 1069 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Despite Defendants’ insistence that the fees incurred 
defending the territorial law and federal law claims cannot be 
segregated, the District Court made no such finding.   Unless 
and until it does, we see no reason to decide when, if ever, the 
“inextricably intertwined” exception to the Figueroa rule 
might apply.  See Gracie, 217 F.3d at 1070 (“[T]he 
impossibility of making an exact apportionment does not 
relieve the district court of its duty to make some attempt to 
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adjust the fee award in an effort to reflect an 
apportionment.”). 
 
 Moreover, we remain unconvinced that where federal 
and territorial claims are “inextricably intertwined,” it 
necessarily makes sense to award fees to the prevailing party 
for the entirety of the litigation under section 541.  The rule 
proposed by Defendants, it seems to us, would encourage 
parties to obfuscate time entries.  Indeed, the fact that 
Defendants cite their own time entries as evidence that the 
claims were inextricably intertwined lends credence to that 
concern.  Moreover, Defendants’ proposed rule seems 
particularly inequitable in a case, such as this one, where the 
majority of the parties’ energy was spent litigating the federal 
claim, not the territorial claims.   
 
 In sum, the District Court should have attempted to 
apportion the fees incurred defending the territorial and 
federal claims. 
 
B. 
 
 Once the time spent on the federal and territorial 
claims is apportioned, the question remains whether 
Defendants may recover fees spent defending the federal 
claim at all.  As it happens, Fair Wind’s sole federal claim 
was brought under the Lanham Act, § 35(a) of which permits 
the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees only “in 
exceptional cases.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  Defendants argue 
that this case meets the standard for exceptionality, and that 
they are therefore entitled to reasonable fees expended on the 
entirety of the litigation. 
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 As we have explained elsewhere, “Congress added the 
attorney’s fee provision of § 35(a) to the Lanham Act in 1975 
in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Fleischmann 
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967), 
holding that attorney’s fees were not available in trademark 
cases under the Lanham Act absent express statutory 
authority.”  Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 
224 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2000).  However, while “the 
statute now expressly provides for an award of attorney’s fees 
at the discretion of the court in ‘exceptional cases,’ 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(a), it does not define an ‘exceptional case[].’”  Id. at 
279-80 (alteration in original).   
 
 Our case law requires a district court to engage in a 
“two-step process”  before determining that a case is 
“exceptional” under § 35(a): 
 
First, the District Court must decide whether the 
defendant engaged in any culpable conduct. We 
have listed bad faith, fraud, malice, and 
knowing infringement as non-exclusive 
examples of the sort of culpable conduct that 
could support a fee award. Moreover, the 
culpable conduct may relate not only to the 
circumstances of the Lanham Act violation, but 
also to the way the losing party handled himself 
during the litigation. Second, if the District 
Court finds culpable conduct, it must decide 
whether the circumstances are “exceptional” 
enough to warrant a fee award. 
 
Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal 
citation omitted).  The requirement that a district court find 
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culpability before awarding attorneys’ fees under the Lanham 
Act has been in place in this Circuit for over two decades.  
See Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 
48 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that awarding fees under § 35(a) is 
inappropriate absent an “explicit finding . . . that [the losing 
party] acted willfully or in bad faith”).   
 
 While this action was on appeal, the Supreme Court 
handed down Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, 
Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749 (2014), analyzing when a district court 
may award fees under § 285 of the Patent Act.  Like § 35(a) 
of the Lanham Act, § 285 provides that “[t]he court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285.   
 
 Prior to Octane Fitness, the Federal Circuit took the 
position that “a case is ‘exceptional’ only if a district court 
either finds litigation-related misconduct of an independently 
sanctionable magnitude or determines that the litigation was 
both ‘brought in subjective bad faith’ and ‘objectively 
baseless.’” Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (quoting 
Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 
1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).  The Octane Fitness Court 
rejected this standard, embracing a definition of “exceptional” 
far more expansive than the one articulated by the Federal 
Circuit in Brooks.  Looking to the plain meaning of the term, 
the Court explained that “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one 
that stands out from others with respect to the substantive 
strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the 
governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable 
manner in which the case was litigated.”  Id. at 1756.  Thus, it 
is within a court’s discretion to find a case “exceptional” 
based upon “the governing law and the facts of the case,” 
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irrespective of whether the losing party is culpable.  For 
example, “a case presenting . . . exceptionally meritless 
claims may sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to 
warrant a fee award.”  Id. at 1757.  This is so even if the 
losing party’s conduct did not suggest “bad faith, fraud, 
malice, [or] knowing infringement.”  Green, 486 F.3d at 103. 
 
 While Octane Fitness directly concerns the scope of a 
district court’s discretion to award fees for “exceptional” case 
under § 285 of the Patent Act, the case controls our 
interpretation of § 35(a) of the Lanham Act.  Not only is § 
285 identical to § 35(a), but Congress referenced § 285 in 
passing § 35(a).  See S. Rep. No. 93–1400, at 2 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7133; see also 
Securacomm Consulting, 224 F.3d at 281.  Thus, we have 
“look[ed] to the interpretation of the patent statute for 
guidance” in interpreting § 35(a).  Id.  Moreover, in its 
explication of the word “exceptional,” the Octane Fitness 
Court relied in part on the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the term 
“exceptional,” as used in § 35(a) of the Lanham Act, means 
“uncommon” or “not run-of-the-mill.”  Octane Fitness, 134 
S. Ct. at 1756 (quoting Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-
B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).  In so 
doing, the Octane Fitness Court noted that the Lanham Act 
fee provision is “identical” to § 285 of the Patent Act. Id.  We 
believe that the Court was sending a clear message that it was 
defining “exceptional” not just for the fee provision in the 
Patent Act, but for the fee provision in the Lanham Act as 
well.   
 
 We therefore import Octane Fitness’s definition of 
“exceptionality” into our interpretation of § 35(a) of the 
Lanham Act.  Under Octane Fitness, a district court may find 
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a case “exceptional,” and therefore award fees to the 
prevailing party, when (a) there is an unusual discrepancy in 
the merits of the positions taken by the parties or (b) the 
losing party has litigated the case in an “unreasonable 
manner.”  Id.; cf. Green, 486 F.3d at 103 (noting that a district 
court may award fees as a result of either the circumstances of 
the Lanham Act violation or the way in which the losing party 
litigated the claim).  Whether litigation positions or litigation 
tactics are “exceptional” enough to merit attorneys’ fees must 
be determined by district courts “in the case-by-case exercise 
of their discretion, considering the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756.  
Importantly, that discretion is not cabined by a threshold 
requirement that the losing party acted culpably.  The losing 
party’s blameworthiness may well play a role in a district 
court’s analysis of the “exceptionality” of a case, but Octane 
Fitness has eliminated the first step in our two-step test for 
awarding fees under § 35(a) of the Lanham Act.   
 
 The parties ask us to decide whether this case merits 
attorneys’ fees under § 35(a) of the Lanham Act.  We decline 
to do so.  With its unparalleled knowledge of the litigation 
and the parties, the District Court is better suited to make that 
assessment in the first instance.  See Securacomm Consulting, 
224 F.3d at 279.  We therefore remand to the District Court, 
so that it may determine whether fees are appropriate under 
this slightly altered standard for awarding fees in Lanham Act 
cases.8 
V. 
 
                                              
8 We similarly decline to reach the “reasonableness” of the 
District Court’s fee award.   
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 We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Fair  
Wind’s trade dress and unjust enrichment claims.  However, 
we vacate the District Court’s award of attorneys’ fees.  On 
remand, the District Court must determine whether this case 
is an “exceptional” one under § 35(a) of the Lanham Act.  If 
it is, the Court may award reasonable fees for the entirety of 
the litigation.  If it is not, the Court must subtract from its 
award any fees accrued by Defendants in litigating the 
Lanham Act claim.  
